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SET-THEORETIC REFLECTION IS EQUIVALENT TO
INDUCTION OVER WELL-FOUNDED CLASSES
ANTON FREUND
Abstract. We show that induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes
is equivalent to the reflection principle which asserts that any true formula of
first order set theory with real parameters holds in some transitive set. The
equivalence is proved in primitive recursive set theory (which is weaker than
Kripke-Platek set theory) extended by the axiom of dependent choice.
1. Introduction
The present paper connects two major themes of set theory: reflection and the
absoluteness of well-foundedness, where the latter is embodied by the principle of
induction over well-founded classes.
Reflection principles in set theory express that any suitable property of the set-
theoretic universe is already satisfied in some set. They are important for the
foundations of set theory, because they have a particularly strong intrinsic justific-
ation. This is expressed in the following statement, which H. Wang [25, Section 8.7]
attributes to K. Go¨del:
“The universe of sets cannot be uniquely characterized (i.e., distinguished
from all its initial segments) by any internal structural property of the mem-
bership relation in it which is expressible in any logic of finite or transfinite
type, including infinitary logics of any cardinal number.”
As the last part of the quoted sentence suggests, reflection principles have been
considered for rather general classes of properties. Often, the aim was to justify
strong axioms that go beyond those of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Early results
in this direction are due to A. Le´vy [14] and P. Bernays [2]. As examples of recent
investigations into strong reflection principles, we cite the work of W. Tait [24],
P. Koellner [11] and P. Welch [26].
In the present paper, we focus on reflection for first order formulas in the usual
language of set theory. For reasons explained below, we must also assume that all
parameters are reals (i. e. subsets of ω). Hence our reflection principle is given by
the schema
∀r⊆ω(ψ(r)→ ∃N (“N is a transitive set” ∧ ψ(r)
N )),
where ψ ≡ ψ(x) is a formula with a single free variable and ψ(r)N refers to the
usual notion of relativization. Note that several parameters are readily coded into
a single one. It is well-known that the given reflection principle is provable in
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, where it plays an important technical role (e. g. for
the justification of forcing in terms of countable transitive models). First order
reflection is also important to understand the foundations of weaker set theories. In
particular, the extension of Kripke-Platek set theory by the given reflection principle
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is one of the strongest axiom systems for which we have an ordinal analysis, which
is due to M. Rathjen [17]. In the context of this analysis, Rathjen mentions that
reflection for formulas of first order set theory corresponds to β-model reflection in
second order arithmetic (a detailed proof of a similar result can be found in [18]).
Note that our restriction to real parameters is completely natural when one is
interested in consequences for second order arithmetic.
Since our reflection principle is provable in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, we will
work over a weaker base theory, namely primitive recursive set theory with infinity.
This theory is based on the notion of primitive recursive set function, which has been
identified by R. Jensen and C. Karp [10]. Whenever we speak of primitive recursive
set functions, we will assume that ω is admitted as a parameter. Primitive recursive
set theory, as described by Rathjen [16], consists of basic axioms (extensionality,
regularity and infinity) and axioms which ensure that the primitive recursive set
functions are total and satisfy their defining equations. Alternatively, one can
read the entire paper with Kripke-Platek set theory as base theory (again with
infinity; see [1] for an extensive introduction). The latter is stronger than primitive
recursive set theory, as Σ-recursion covers primitive recursion. Note that the choice
of Kripke-Platek set theory ties in with Rathjen’s aforementioned ordinal analysis.
Furthermore, the notion of ∆-class is particularly natural in Kripke-Platek set
theory, where ∆-separation is available. In any case, we will eventually extend our
base theory by the axiom of dependent choice (DC), in order to obtain a descending
sequence in an ill-founded order.
We now specify the induction principle to which reflection is supposed to be
equivalent. Let us agree that a relation <X on a class X (both definable) is well-
founded if we have
WF[X ] :≡ ∀w(w 6= ∅ → ∃x∈w∀y∈w¬ y <X x).
For a formula ϕ(x, ~z) with a distinguished induction variable x, induction along X
can be expressed as
Ind[X,ϕ] :≡ ∀~z(∀x∈X(∀y<Xxϕ(y, ~z)→ ϕ(x, ~z))→ ∀x∈Xϕ(x, ~z)).
Note that there is no restriction on the values of the parameters ~z. By induction
for ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes we mean the schema
WF[X ]→ Ind[X,ϕ],
where X is ∆-definable with a real parameter. Let us stress the fact that X is not
required to be set-like.
To make the statement of our induction principle more precise, we recall that
a quantifier is bounded if it occurs in the form ∀x∈y · · · or in the form ∃x∈y · · · ,
where y is a set (not a proper class). A Σ-formula (Π-formula) is a formula in
negation normal form in which all universal (existential) quantifiers are bounded.
Over Kripke-Platek set theory, any Σ-formula is equivalent to a Σ1-formula, but
over primitive recursive set theory the former notion is more liberal. A ∆-class is
one that can be defined both by a Σ-formula and by a Π-formula. To ensure that an
ordered class (X,<X) is ∆-definable, it is most convenient to exhibit a Σ-formula
θΣ(x, y, r) and a Π-formula θΠ(x, y, r) that define the relation x ≤X y. The point
is that X and <X can be recovered from ≤X , provided that <X is well-founded
and hence irreflexive. Formally, we abbreviate
x ≤rX y :≡ θΣ(x, y, r), x ∈ X
r :≡ x ≤rX x, x <
r
X y :≡ x ≤
r
X y ∧ x 6= y.
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To express that θΣ and θΠ provide a ∆-definition of X
r we use the formula
∆-Rel[Xr] :≡ ∀x,y(x ≤
r
X y → x ∈ X
r ∧ y ∈ Xr) ∧ ∀x,y(θΣ(x, y, r)↔ θΠ(x, y, r)),
where the first conjunct ensures that ≤rX does indeed have field X
r. Induction over
∆(R)-definable well-founded classes can now officially be given as the schema
∀r⊆ω(∆-Rel[X
r] ∧WF[Xr]→ Ind[Xr, ϕ]).
The proof that reflection implies induction is rather straightforward, so we give it
right away. The result is, of course, a schema: Given arbitrary formulas θΣ, θΠ
and ϕ as in the induction principle, we will construct a formula ψ and a proof that
reflection for ψ implies induction for ϕ along the order defined by θΣ and θΠ.
Proposition 1.1. Reflection for first order formulas with real parameters implies
induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes.
Proof. Given formulas θΣ, θΠ and ϕ as in the above exposition of the induction
principle, we put
ψ(r) :≡ ∀x,y(θΣ(x, y, r)↔ θΠ(x, y, r)) ∧ ¬ Ind[X
r, ϕ].
Working in primitive recursive set theory, we fix a value r ⊆ ω of the parameter
and assume that reflection for ψ(r) holds. The induction principle is established by
contradiction: We assume that the premises ∆-Rel[Xr] and WF[Xr] hold while the
conclusion Ind[Xr, ϕ] fails. Then ψ(r) holds, and reflection yields ψ(r)N for some
transitive set N . Due to the first conjunct of ψ(r)N , we can use the absoluteness
properties of Σ- and Π-formulas to show that x ∈ Xr and x <rX y are absolute
betweenN and the universe (for x, y ∈ N). Writing ϕN (x, ~z) :≡ x ∈ N → ϕ(x, ~z)N ,
the second conjunct of ψ(r)N amounts to
¬ Ind[Xr, ϕ]N ≡ ∃~z∈N(∀x∈Xr (∀y<r
X
xϕN (y, ~z)→ ϕN (x, ~z)) ∧ ∃x∈Xr¬ϕN (x, ~z)).
Fix witnesses ~z for this statement. Since ∆0-separation is available in primitive
recursive set theory (see e. g. [4, Corollary 1.1.10]), we can form the set
w := {x ∈ N | (x ∈ Xr)N ∧ ¬ϕ(x, ~z)N} = {x ∈ Xr | ¬ϕN (x, ~z)}.
The second conjunct of ¬ Ind[Xr, ϕ]N tells us that w is non-empty. By the assump-
tion WF[Xr] we get an element x ∈ w such that y <rX x fails for all y ∈ w. The
latter means that ∀y<r
X
xϕN (y, ~z) holds. Now the first conjunct of ¬ Ind[Xr, ϕ]N
yields ϕN (x, ~z), which is incompatible with x ∈ w. 
As the main result of the present paper, we will prove the converse direction:
induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes implies reflection for first order
formulas with real parameters, assuming the axiom of dependent choice. An official
statement of the resulting equivalence is given as Theorem 3.5 below.
Let us sketch how our main result is proved: The basic idea is to approach
reflection via completeness. Assuming that ψ(r) fails in every transitive model, we
will construct a class-sized proof tree of ¬ψ(r) (somewhat similar to a β-proof in
the sense of J.-Y. Girard [8]). Induction over this proof will show that ¬ψ(r) holds
in the set-theoretic universe, so that reflection holds because its premise fails.
Our approach to completeness relies on K. Schu¨tte’s [19, 20] method of deduction
chains: The idea is to build an attempted proof of a given formula ϕ from the
bottom up. This will yield either a well-founded proof of ϕ or an attempted proof
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with an infinite branch. From the latter one can read off a countermodel to ϕ,
provided that the proof search was sufficiently systematic.
For each set M , we will use the method of deduction chains to search for an
extensional model (Mf ,∈)  ψ(r) with ω∪ r ⊆Mf ⊆M . Since Schu¨tte’s approach
yields a countermodel to the end-formula of the attempted proof, we should search
for a proof Srψ(M) of the formula
(1) ¬ψ(r) ∨ ¬∀x,y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y),
where the second disjunct ensures that the resulting model is extensional. In order
to obtain a model Mf ⊆M , we will work in M -logic. This means that Srψ(M) may
use the infinitary rule
· · · θ(a) · · · (a ∈M) ,
∀x θ(x)
which allows to infer a universal formula ∀x θ(x) once we have proved the premise
θ(a) for each a ∈ M . The proof Srψ(M) can thus be realized as a labelled subtree
ofM<ω, the tree of finite sequences with entries inM (where we assume {0, 1} ⊆M
to have names for the premises of the usual unary and binary rules). The method of
deduction chains will allow us to build the proofs Srψ(M) in a particularly uniform
way. This construction can have two outcomes:
• There is an M ⊇ ω ∪ {r} such that the tree Srψ(M) ⊆M
<ω has an infinite
branch f : ω →M (i. e. we have 〈f(0), . . . , f(n−1)〉 ∈ Srψ(M) for all n ∈ ω).
• The proof tree Srψ(M) is well-founded (with respect to end-extensions of
sequences) for every set M ⊇ ω ∪ {r}.
In the first case, we will see that
Mf := {f(i) | i ∈ ω} ∪ ω ∪ {r} ⊆M
is an extensional model of ψ(r). An application of Mostowski collapsing will then
yield the transitive model required for reflection. Now consider the second case,
in which all proof trees Srψ(M) are well-founded. Due to the uniformity of the
construction, we will be able to glue the trees Srψ(M) into a class-sized proof tree
Srψ(V) ⊆ V
<ω, where V denotes the universe of sets. Invoking the principle of
induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes, we will show that all formulas
in the proof Srψ(V) are true. In particular, this applies to the end-formula (1) of our
proofs. Since extensionality holds in the set-theoretic universe, it follows that ψ(r)
must fail, so that reflection holds. Full details of the construction will be worked
out in the following sections.
Based on the preceeding proof sketch, we can now explain the restriction to
real parameters: Each node of a tree Srψ(M) does only contain a finite amount of
information, which means that the information collected along a branch is at most
countable. To be somewhat more precise, the method of deduction chains relies on
the fact that each formula on a branch f is false in the corresponding model Mf .
This property is proved by induction over the length of formulas. In order to ensure
that a formula ∃x θ(x) on f fails in Mf , every instance θ(a) with a ∈Mf must thus
appear on f as well. However, a branch does only contain countably many formulas.
Instead of reals, one could consider all hereditarily countable sets as parameters.
This does not seem to increase generality, since hereditarily countable sets can be
represented by well-founded trees (see e. g. [22, Section VII.3]).
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To explain the context of our result, we recall that equivalences between reflection
and induction principles are well-known in the context of first and second order
arithmetic: Due to G. Kreisel and A. Le´vy [12], reflection (with parameters) over
elementary arithmetic is equivalent to induction along the natural numbers, while
reflection over Peano arithmetic is equivalent to induction along (the usual notation
system for) the ordinal ε0 = min{α |ωα = α} (these results have been refined by
D. Leivant [13] and H. Ono [15]). As shown by H. Friedman [6], the principle
of ω-model reflection in second order arithmetic is equivalent to bar induction,
i. e. induction along arbitrary well-orders on N (this result has been refined by
S. Simpson [21] as well as G. Ja¨ger and T. Strahm [9]).
Our use of deduction chains is inspired by the aforementioned paper by Ja¨ger
and Strahm. However, one important innovation is necessary in the context of set
theory: Ja¨ger and Strahm search for an ω-model, which means that the underlying
set of the model is essentially fixed in advance (second order variables are treated
as predicates). In set theory, we must consider all possible supersets M , and the
underlying set Mf ⊆ M of the resulting model is determined by the branch f , as
described above. Our definitions of Srψ(M) and Mf are very close to a draft [3]
by the present author. In [5] it has been shown that the construction becomes
even more uniform in the case of the constructible hierarchy: essentially, the map
α 7→ Srψ(Lα) can be turned into a dilator in the sense of Girard [7]. This allows for
an even finer analysis of reflection under the axiom of constructibility, as shown in
a first version of the present paper (available as arXiv:1909.00677v1).
To conclude this introduction, we mention two refinements of our result: Firstly,
the proof of our equivalence reveals some relations between the complexity of the
reflection formulas that are needed to derive induction for formulas from a given
complexity class, and vice versa. These will be discussed at the end of the paper.
Secondly, one can observe that the reflection formula and the corresponding well-
founded class depend on the same real parameter. In particular, it follows that
reflection for first order sentences is equivalent to induction along well-founded
classes that are ∆-definable without parameters.
2. Transitive models via deduction chains
In the introduction we have described how Schu¨tte’s method of deduction chains
can be used to search for transitive models of set-theoretic formulas. The details of
this approach will be worked out in the present section.
We fix some notation and terminology: Let x<ω be the set of finite sequences with
entries from a given set x. By σ ⊳ τ we express that the sequence σ is a proper end-
extension of the sequence τ . Writing σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σn−1〉 and τ = 〈τ0, . . . , τm−1〉,
this means that we have m < n and σi = τi for all i < m. A non-empty subset
T ⊆ x<ω is a tree if σ ∈ T and σ ⊳ τ imply τ ∈ T . In particular, any tree contains
the empty sequence 〈〉. The extension of a sequence σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σn−1〉 ∈ x<ω by
an element a ∈ x will be denoted by σ⌢a := 〈σ0, . . . σn−1, a〉.
All object formulas that we consider will be formulas in the usual language of first
order set theory. They may contain arbitrary sets as parameters (i. e. each set amay
be used as a constant symbol with canonical interpretation a). By an M -formula
we shall mean a formula with parameters from M . For technical reasons, all object
formulas are assumed to be in negation normal form. This means that formulas
are built from literals (negated and unnegated prime formulas) by the connectives
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∧,∨ and the quantifiers ∀, ∃. To negate a formula one applies de Morgan’s rules
and omits double negations in front of prime formulas. Expressions such as ¬ϕ and
ϕ→ ψ should thus be read as abbreviations (e. g. one may write ¬(x ∈ y → x ∈ z)
in order to refer to the object formula x ∈ y ∧¬x ∈ z). Unless noted otherwise, we
assume that object formulas are closed (i. e. contain no free variables).
An M -sequent is a finite sequence of (closed) M -formulas. The intuitive inter-
pretation of a sequent Γ = 〈ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1〉 is the disjunction ϕ0 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn−1. In
particular, the order of the formulas in a sequent is irrelevant from a semantic
perspective. It will, however, be crucial for the construction below. As usual,
we write Γ, ϕ rather than Γ⌢ϕ in the context of sequents. Similarly, we write
ϕ,Γ := 〈ϕ, ϕ0, . . . , ϕn−1〉 for Γ as before. We can now give a precise definition of
the search trees from the introduction. To understand the details of the definition
one should consider the proof of Proposition 2.2.
Definition 2.1. Consider a formula ψ ≡ ψ(x) with a single free variable x and
no parameters. Given a real r ⊆ ω and a set M ⊇ ω ∪ {r}, we define a tree
Srψ(M) ⊆M
<ω and a labelling function lM : S
r
ψ(M)→ “M -sequents” by recursion
over the finite sequences in M<ω. In the base of the recursion we stipulate
〈〉 ∈ Srψ(M) and lM (〈〉) = 〈¬ψ(r),¬∀x,y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y)〉.
As Srψ(M) is to become a tree, the recursion step is only interesting for σ ∈ S
r
ψ(M).
We distinguish cases according to the first formula of the sequent lM (σ) = ϕ,Γ
(which will never be empty): If ϕ is a true literal, then σ is a leaf of Srψ(M). If ϕ
is a false literal, then we stipulate
σ⌢a ∈ Srψ(M) ⇔ a = 0 and lM (σ
⌢0) = Γ, ϕ,
observing 0 ∈ ω ⊆M . If ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 is a conjunction, then we set
σ⌢a ∈ Srψ(M) ⇔ a ∈ {0, 1} and lM (σ
⌢a) = Γ, ϕ, ϕa.
If ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1 is a disjunction, then we define
σ⌢a ∈ Srψ(M) ⇔ a = 0 and lM (σ
⌢0) = Γ, ϕ, ϕ0, ϕ1.
If ϕ ≡ ∀x θ(x) is universal, then we put
σ⌢a ∈ Srψ(M) ⇔ a ∈M and lM (σ
⌢a) = Γ, ϕ, θ(a).
To avoid confusion, we note that a ∈ M is automatic for σ⌢a ∈ Srψ(M) ⊆ M
<ω.
Finally, assume that ϕ ≡ ∃x θ(x) is existential. Writing σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σn−1〉, let b
be the first entry of the list
r, σ0, 0, σ1, 1, . . . , σn−1, n− 1, n, n+ 1, n+ 2, . . .
such that θ(b) does not already occur in Γ (note that ω ∪ {r} ⊆ M and σ ∈ M<ω
ensure b ∈M). Then set
σ⌢a ∈ Srψ(M) ⇔ a = 0 and lM (σ
⌢0) = Γ, ϕ, θ(b)
to complete the recursive definition of Srψ(M) and lM .
To see how the previous definition can be formalized in primitive recursive set
theory, we recall some observations from [4, Chapter 1] (all theorem numbers in the
present paragraph refer to this reference): Proposition 1.2.8 tells us thatM 7→M<ω
is a primitive recursive set function (with parameter ω). In particular, M<ω exists
as a set. Using Corollary 1.2.11, one can verify that σ ∈ Srψ(M) is a primitive
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recursive relation in σ, r andM , and that (M,σ) 7→ lM (σ) is a primitive recursive set
function. Combining these facts by Corollary 1.1.10, it follows that Srψ(M) ⊆M
<ω
is a set and that (r,M) 7→ Srψ(M) is primitive recursive. Similarly, Proposition 1.2.2
tells us that the class-sized function (M,σ) 7→ lM (σ) yields a primitive recursive
family of set-sized functions lM .
As usual, a function f : ω →M is called a branch of the tree Srψ(M) ⊆M
<ω if
we have
f ↾n := 〈f(0), . . . , f(n− 1)〉 ∈ Srψ(M)
for every number n ∈ ω. The following proposition is typical for the method of
deduction chains insofar as a branch of the search tree yields a model. We refer
to [4, Section 1.3] for a detailed formalization of the satisfaction relation in primitive
recursive set theory.
Proposition 2.2. If f is a branch of Srψ(M), then Mf := {f(i) | i ∈ ω} ∪ ω ∪ {r}
is extensional and we have (Mf ,∈)  ψ(r).
Proof. An M -formula is said to occur on f if it is an entry of a sequent lM (f ↾n)
for some number n. We will show that every formula that occurs on f is false
when relativized to Mf . To deduce the proposition it suffices to observe that ¬ψ(r)
and the negation of extensionality occur in lM (〈〉) and hence on any branch f .
The open claim is established by induction over the height of formulas. Let us
first consider a literal ϕ that occurs on f . For suitable numbers k < m and n we
can write lM (f ↾ n) = 〈ϕ0, . . . , ϕm−1〉 with ϕ ≡ ϕk. Considering the construction
of Srψ(M), we see that ϕ is the first formula in lM (f ↾ (n + k)). If ϕ was true,
then f ↾ (n + k) would be a leaf of Srψ(M), again by construction. This would
contradict the assumption that f is a branch. Hence ϕ must be false, as required
(relativization to Mf is irrelevant here, since the literal ϕ contains no quantifiers).
Let us now consider the case where ϕ ≡ ∀x θ(x) is universal. As before, we can find
an n such that ϕ is the first formula in lM (f ↾n). Since f is a branch we have
(f ↾n)⌢f(n) = f ↾(n+ 1) ∈ Srψ(M).
By construction, the instance θ(f(n)) occurs in lM (f ↾ (n + 1)) and hence on f .
Since θ(f(n)) is shorter than ϕ, the induction hypothesis tells us that θ(f(n)) is
false when relativized toMf . In view of f(n) ∈Mf it follows that the relativization
of ϕ ≡ ∀x θ(x) to Mf is false as well. Let us now consider the case of an existential
formula ϕ ≡ ∃x θ(x) that occurs on f . Invoking the induction hypothesis, it suffices
to show that each instance θ(a) with a ∈ Mf occurs on f as well. By induction
on n we show that this holds for every a in the list
(2) r, f(0), 0, f(1), 1, . . . , f(n− 1), n− 1.
Assuming the induction hypothesis, let us argue that the formula θ(f(n)) occurs
on f (for a = r or a = n one argues similarly): In the construction of Srψ(M) the
sequents in the labels are extended and permuted, but no formula is ever removed.
Hence we may pick a number N > n such that lM (f ↾ N) contains ϕ and all
instances θ(a) with a in the list (2). Increasing N if necessary, we may assume that
ϕ is the first formula in lM (f ↾N). According to the construction of S
p
ψ(M), the
instance θ(f(n)) is then added to lM (f ↾ (N + 1)), unless it was already present.
The remaining cases of a conjunction ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 and a disjunction ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1
are similar and easier. We do not need to consider the case of a negation, since all
our formulas are assumed to be in negation normal form. 
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Recall that we write σ ⊳ τ if the sequence σ is a proper end-extension of the
sequence τ . Assuming the axiom of dependent choice (DC), we can construct a
branch of any tree on which ⊳ is ill-founded. This leads to the following result, in
which the first alternative amounts to the conclusion of reflection.
Corollary 2.3 (DC). Consider a formula ψ(x) with a single free variable x and
no parameters. For each real r ⊆ ω one of the following alternatives must hold:
(i) We have (N,∈)  ψ(r) for some transitive set N ∋ r.
(ii) The order (Srψ(M),⊳) is well-founded for every set M ⊇ ω ∪ {r}.
Proof. Let us show that (i) holds if (ii) fails: Assuming the latter, we get a set
M ⊇ ω∪{r} and a non-empty z ⊆ Srψ(M) without a ⊳-minimal element. Consider
Tz := {σ ∈ S
r
ψ(M) | τ ⊳ σ for some τ ∈ z}
and define a binary relation ⊳0 on Tz by stipulating that σ ⊳0 τ holds if σ is of
the form σ = τ⌢a for some a ∈ M . Using dependent choice, we get a sequence of
elements σn ∈ Tz with σ0 = 〈〉 and σn+1 ⊳0 σn for all n. If we define f(n) as the last
entry of σn+1, then we have f ↾n = σn, so that f is a branch of Tz ⊆ Srψ(M). The
setMf from the previous proposition is then a model of ψ(r), andMf is extensional.
Due to the latter, the Mostowski collapse c : Mf → N with transitive image N
is an ∈-isomorphism, so that we get (N,∈)  ψ(c(r)). Now it suffices to observe
that we have c(r) = r, since ω ∪ {r} ⊆Mf is transitive. An account of Mostowski
collapsing in primitive recursive set theory is given in [4, Proposition 1.2.4]. 
3. Class-sized proof trees and truth in the universe
In the previous section we have constructed search trees Srψ(M) which test
whether a given formula ψ(r) holds in some submodel Mf of M . We will now
show that the trees Srψ(M) glue to a class-sized proof tree S
r
ψ(V) with end formula
¬ψ(r) ∨ ¬∀x,y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y).
If this tree is well-founded, then we can use induction to conclude that ψ(r) fails
in the set-theoretic universe V. Together with Corollary 2.3 this will be enough to
establish the reflection principle.
Let us begin with a straightforward but crucial observation, which will allow us
to glue the trees Srψ(M) ⊆M
<ω for different arguments M .
Lemma 3.1. Consider sets M and N with ω∪{r} ⊆M ⊆ N . Then σ ∈ Srψ(M) is
equivalent to σ ∈ Srψ(N), for each σ ∈M
<ω. Furthermore, we have lM (σ) = lN(σ)
whenever we have σ ∈ Srψ(M).
Proof. The claims can be verified by simultaneous induction over the sequence σ,
following the recursive clauses from Definition 2.1. Crucially, the list
r, σ0, 0, σ1, 1, . . . , σn−1, n− 1, n, n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . ,
which is considered if the first formula of lM (σ) = lN (σ) is existential, does only
depend on the entries of σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σn−1〉 and not on fixed enumerations of the
ambient sets M and N . 
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The previous lemma shows that σ ∈ Srψ(M) does not depend on M , as long as
we have ω ∪ {r} ⊆ M and σ ∈ M<ω. Given a sequence σ ∈ V<ω with arbitrary
entries from V, an obvious choice for M is
Mσ := {σ0, . . . , σn−1} ∪ ω ∪ {r} for σ = 〈σ0, . . . , σn−1〉.
The labels of Srψ(M) consist of M -formulas, which may contain parameters (con-
stant symbols) fromM . In the following we will speak of V-formulas and V-sequents
to emphasize that arbitrary sets are admitted as parameters. The trees Srψ(M) from
Definition 2.1 can now be glued as follows:
Definition 3.2. Consider a formula ψ ≡ ψ(x) with a single free variable x and no
parameters. For each real r ⊆ ω we define a class Srψ(V) by
σ ∈ Srψ(V) :⇔ σ ∈ V
<ω and σ ∈ Srψ(Mσ).
We also define a class function l : Srψ(V)→ “V-sequents” by setting l(σ) := lMσ(σ).
In the previous section we have observed that (r,M) 7→ Srψ(M) is a primitive
recursive set function. Hence Srψ(V) is a primitive recursive class, in the sense that
its characteristic function is primitive recursive. It is well-known that primitive
recursive set functions have Σ-definable graphs (see [10, Section 2]). Thus Srψ(V) is
∆-definable, uniformly in the parameter r. Clearly, the relation ⊳ is also primitive
recursive and ∆-definable (recall that we have σ ⊳ τ if σ is a proper end-extension
of τ). The following yields a reformulation of alternative (ii) from Corollary 2.3.
Lemma 3.3. If (Srψ(M),⊳) is well-founded for every set M ⊇ ω ∪ {r}, then the
class (Srψ(V),⊳) is well-founded as well.
Proof. Given a non-empty z ⊆ Srψ(V) ⊆ V
<ω, we put
M :=
⋃
{Mσ |σ ∈ z}.
Due to Lemma 3.1 we have z ⊆ Srψ(M). Now the assumption of the lemma yields
a ⊳-minimal element of z, as required. 
In the proof of our main result we will want to use induction over σ ∈ Srψ(V)
to show that each sequent l(σ) contains a true formula. The following observation
ensures that the required truth definition is available.
Lemma 3.4. Any formula in a sequent l(σ) with σ ∈ Srψ(V) is a substitution
instance of a subformula of ¬ψ(r) or of ¬∀x,y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y).
Proof. In view of the definition of Srψ(V), it suffices to establish the claim for all
formulas that occur in some sequent lM (σ) with M ⊇ ω ∪ {r} and σ ∈ Srψ(M).
For fixed M , this can be accomplished by a straightforward induction over the
sequence σ, which follows the recursive clauses from Definition 2.1. 
We now have all ingredients to complete the proof of our main result. In the
introduction we have given precise formulations of the reflection and induction
principles that it involves.
Theorem 3.5. The following are equivalent over primitive recursive set theory
extended by the axiom of dependent choice:
(1) reflection for first order formulas with real parameters,
(2) induction over ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes.
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Proof. From Proposition 1.1 we already know that (1) implies (2). For the converse
direction we assume (2) and establish an arbitrary instance
∀r⊆ω(ψ(r)→ ∃N (“N ∋ r is transitive” ∧ (N,∈)  ψ(r)))
of (1). Aiming at the contrapositive, consider a real r such that ψ(r) does not
hold in any transitive model N ∋ r. By Corollary 2.3 and Lemma 3.3, it follows
that (Srψ(V),⊳) is a well-founded class. We will use induction over the latter to
show that each sequent l(σ) with σ ∈ Srψ(V) contains a true formula. Note that
the reference to truth is unproblematic, as Lemma 3.4 ensures that we are only
concerned with instances of finitely many formulas. If the induction is successful,
it tells us that there is a true formula in the sequent
l(〈〉) = 〈¬ψ(r),¬∀x,y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y)〉.
Since extensionality is an axiom of primitive recursive set theory, this means that
the formula ¬ψ(r) must be true in the set-theoretic universe. Hence reflection for
ψ(r) holds because its premise fails. It remains to carry out the induction. To
prove the induction step, we distinguish cases according to the first formula in
l(σ) = ϕ,Γ.
Note that the sequent l(σ) is never empty, as pointed out in Definition 2.1. Let us
begin with the case where ϕ is a literal. If ϕ is true, then we are done. Otherwise,
Definition 2.1 yields σ⌢0 ∈ Srψ(Mσ) and lMσ(σ
⌢0) = Γ, ϕ. In view of Mσ⌢0 =Mσ
we get σ⌢0 ∈ Srψ(V) and l(σ
⌢0) = Γ, ϕ. We also have σ⌢0 ⊳ σ, so that the
induction hypothesis yields a true formula in l(σ⌢0). In the present case, the
sequent l(σ⌢0) is just a permutation of l(σ), so that the latter contains the same
true formula. Next, we consider the case of an existential formula ϕ ≡ ∃x θ(x).
Similarly to the previous case, the construction from Definition 2.1 leads to
σ⌢0 ∈ Srψ(V) and l(σ
⌢0) = Γ, ϕ, θ(b),
for a certain parameter b. Again, the induction hypothesis yields a true formula in
the sequent l(σ⌢0). If this formula lies in Γ, ϕ, then it occurs in l(σ) and we are
done. So now assume that θ(b) is true. Then b witnesses the truth of the existential
formula ϕ, and we are done as well. In the most interesting case we are concerned
with a universal formula ϕ ≡ ∀x θ(x). Aiming at a contradiction, we assume that
every formula in l(σ) is false. In particular ϕ is false, and we may pick an a ∈ V
such that θ(a) is false as well. In view of Mσ ⊆ Mσ⌢a we can use Lemma 3.1 to
obtain σ ∈ Srψ(Mσ⌢a) and
lMσ⌢a(σ) = lMσ (σ) = l(σ) = ϕ,Γ.
By definition we have a ∈ Mσ⌢a, so that Definition 2.1 yields σ⌢a ∈ Srψ(Mσ⌢a)
and hence σ⌢a ∈ Srψ(V). We also get
l(σ⌢a) = lMσ⌢a(σ
⌢a) = Γ, ϕ, θ(a).
In view of σ⌢a ⊳ σ, the induction hypothesis tells us that some formula in this
sequent is true. This contradicts the assumption that all formulas in l(σ) = ϕ,Γ
and the instance θ(a) are false. The remaining cases of a disjunction ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1
and of a conjunction ϕ ≡ ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 are similar and easier. 
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Let us conclude this paper with some observations on formula complexity. Con-
cerning induction along ∆(R)-definable well-founded classes, we first show that
Σn-induction is equivalent to Πn+1-induction, for n > 0. The following argument is
similar to a proof by R. Sommer [23, Lemma 4.5]: We want to establish induction
for a Πn+1-formula ϕ(x) ≡ ∀y θ(x, y) along a ∆(R)-definable class (X,<X). For
this purpose we order the class X × V of pairs by
〈x, y〉 <X×V 〈x
′, y′〉 :⇔ x <X x
′.
It is straightforward to show that <X×V is well-founded if the same holds for <X .
Assume that ϕ satisfies the premise of induction, and consider the Σn-formula
θ′(z) :≡ ∃x,y(z = 〈x, y〉 ∧ θ(x, y)).
To establish the induction step for θ′, we need to deduce θ(x, y) from the assumption
that θ(x′, y′) holds for all pairs 〈x′, y′〉 <X×V 〈x, y〉. The latter amounts to
∀x′<Xx∀y′θ(x
′, y′) ≡ ∀x′<Xx ϕ(x
′).
Since ϕ satisfies the premise of induction, we get ϕ(x) and in particular θ(x, y) for
the relevant y. Now Σn-induction along <X×V yields
∀x∈X∀yθ(x, y) ≡ ∀x∈Xϕ(x).
This is the conclusion of induction for the Πn+1-formula ϕ.
We now discuss the amount of reflection that is needed to deduce induction for a
given formula. In view of the previous paragraph, we may focus on an induction
formula ϕ of complexity Πn+1. In this case the reflection formula
ψ(r) ≡ ∀x,y(θΣ(x, y, r)↔ θΠ(x, y, r)) ∧ ¬ Ind[X
r, ϕ]
from the proof of Proposition 1.1 has complexity Σn+3 (over Kripke-Platek set
theory, where Σ-formulas and Σ1-formulas coincide). In view of Ja¨ger and Strahm’s
analysis of ω-model reflection [9], one might have expected a slightly stronger result,
which would deduce Πn+1-induction from Πn+2-reflection (the latter does not seem
to imply Σn+3-reflection in our setting, due to the restriction to real parameters).
To prove this strengthening one could try to replace Ind[Xr, ϕ] by
∀x∈Xr(∀y<r
X
xϕ(y,~c)→ ϕ(x,~c))→ ∀x∈Xrϕ(x,~c),
where the quantified variables ~z from Ind[Xr, ϕ] are instantiated to suitable para-
meters ~c. If ϕ has complexity Πn+1, then the displayed formula has complex-
ity Σn+2, and the reflection formula has complexity Πn+2. The problem is that
we cannot apply our reflection principle to the new formula, since the parameters
~c may not be reals. Our observation does show that reflection for Πn+2-formulas
implies induction for Πn+1-formulas with real parameters.
Finally, we consider the passage from induction to reflection: In the proof of
Theorem 3.5 we have used induction over σ ∈ Srψ(V) to show that the sequent l(σ)
contains a true formula. If ψ has complexity Σn+1 with n > 0, then l(σ) can only
contain Πn+1-formulas, due to Lemma 3.4. If ψ is a Πn+2-formula, we can lower
the complexity by assuming that ψ(r) holds (since this is the premise of reflection).
Under this assumption, any true formula in l(σ) must again have complexity Πn+1.
Hence Πn+1-induction is sufficient in both cases. Altogether, we have seen that
Σn+3-reflection implies Πn+1-induction (or equivalently Σn-induction), which in
turn implies Πn+2-reflection, for n > 0. The slight mismatch in terms of logical
complexity seems to be caused by the partial restriction to real parameters.
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